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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT MADE NO ERROR IN AWARDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MICHAEL WARD 
Cross-Appellant Peter Coats argues that because the lower court 
characterized—at least in part—his failure to respond in the summary 
judgment proceedings below as a default, the judgment of the lower court 
is vulnerable to direct attack on that basis. Ward questions whether this 
proposition is a matter of settled law. While Coats has admittedly made a 
colorable argument as to the potential invalidity of the concept of default in 
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a summary judgr 3nt oroceeding, he has produced no authority directly 
stating the prop he advances. Ward wishes to point out that there is 
at least one fairly recent example in Utah jurisprudence where an appellate 
court has (at least tacitly) recognized the concept of default in the context 
of summary judgment. See Pitts v. McLachian, 567 P.2d 171, 171, 174 
(Utah 1977) (denying on unrelated grounds the reversal of a summary 
judgment order that the Court characterized as having been entered on 
default). 
Furthermore, Coats essentially would have this Court believe that the 
lower court made no substantive examination of the summary judgment 
pleadings, and simply awarded judgment on the basis of Coats' failure to 
respond. However, this is incorrect—the court below did not find for Ward 
solely on the basis of "default." In fact, the court stated as a preface to its 
order granting summary judgment against Coats. "[t]he Court having 
considered the motions, the memoranda filed by Plaintiff and Defendant 
Graydon (the Court having noted that Defendant Peter Coats had not filed 
any opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) and the 
arguments presented at the hearing, and good cause appearing, it is 
hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed . . . ." Order on Summary 
Judgment Motions and Judgment (emphasis added). In so doing, the lower 
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court made it clear that its judgment against Coats was not solely 
predicated upon his failure to respond, but upon motions, memoranda, 
arguments at hearing, and good cause appearing. This is further 
demonstrated by the lower court's minute entry from Coats' Rule 59 motion 
proceedings, which Coats quotes in his brief to this Court. 
On August 31, 2009, Coats, now represented by counsel, filed the 
present [Rule 59/60 motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and 
explained why Coates is not entitled to reiief from judgment under 
either rule 59 or Rule 60. The Court agrees entirely with the 
plaintiff's analysis and incorporates herein oy reference. The 
analysis therein more than adequately supports the court's 
determination that Coats' motions fail. 
Brief of Peter Coats^lS. 
The lower court did not—as seemingly alleged by Coats— 
abrogate its duty to examine the merits of the claims in the summary 
judgment, and did not make its decision solely on Coats' failure to 
respond. A ruling that Ward's claims on summary judgment were 
legally sufficient is—at the very least—implicit in the lower court's ruling. 
That court's treatment of Coats' Rule 59 and 60 claims for reiief from 
judgment illustrate this even more clearly. 
Furthermore, even if the lower court's ruling was in fact solely based 
on Coats' failure to respond to Ward's summary judgment motion, this court 
is not required to overturn it. Ward's position remains unchanged with 
regard to the legal claims he raised in the summary judgment, and he 
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maintains that those claims are adeauate to demonstrate Coats' liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
A right ruiing sustainable on correct legal reasoning, even though 
such correct reasoning takes in legal syllogisms not entertained by 
the lower court, will be upheld even though the lower court based 
the ruiing on wrong legal reasoning. The appellate court is not 
confined to an examination of the correctness of the legal 
propositions on which the lower court based its ruiing, but will 
examine the correctness of the ruiing and may sustain it on 
reasoning which involved an entirely different chain of legal 
syllogisms. 
Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork. 74 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1937). 
This Court need not reverse the finding of the lower court simpiy 
because of the "default" language, even if Coats is correct in alleging its 
error. Rather, the decision should be upheld on the legal merits of the 
claims Ward made below. 
Coats further erroneously alleges that the burden carried by a movant 
for summary judgment is "no different than what occurs in a criminal case." 
In fact, the burdens are hardly analogous at all. In a criminal case, the 
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
certain facts occurred. If this burden is carried adequately, the defendant is 
supposed to be convicted of a crime befitting the proven facts. Summary 
judgment is altogether different. The mere existence of material facts in 
dispute is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment—a movant's 
ability to prove those facts is immaterial to the motion's survival. In this 
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case, Coats has admitted to the facts alleged by Michael Ward in the 
summary judgment. This means tnat to prevail on that motion, Ward 
needed only to have alleged a proper legal claim against Coats that was 
supported by the facts Coats admitted. If Coats wishes to make 
comparisons to the criminal law arena, this situation is more analogous to a 
defendant stipulating to the prosecution's alleged facts (which would— 
under most circumstances imaginable—have the same effect as a guilty 
plea). Coats acts as if his concession to Ward's alleged facts is a small 
matter. Rather, his acceptance of the undisputed facts and failure to 
dispute the proper legal claims brought by Ward indeed entitle Ward to 
summary judgment under the very standard Coats advances. 
II. BECAUSE COATS BREACHED THE DUTIES INHERENT IN JOINT 
TENANCY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO WARD 
Coats'denial of liability is premised on his erroneous argument that 
the trial court erred because it based its grant of summary judgment on 
Coats' failure to oppose the motion rather than the substantive law 
underlying Ward's claim. To support his proposition. Coats mistakenly 
claims that Ward did not cite any legal authority on which the court could 
have based its judgment. But Coats' argument and concomitant 
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conclusion, based on a misreading of the court's order, are incorrect. In 
the motion and hearing for summary judgment, Ward did articulate a legal 
theory of Coats' liability, and the court accepted that theory as a basis for 
recovery. Contrary to Coats' assertion, the court did not base its judgment 
on his failure to file a responsive pleading; rather the court adopted the 
theory advocated by Ward. As he acknowledges in his brief, Coats 
attended the hearing on summary judgment, and the court allowed him to 
make an argument in opposition to the motion. That the court did not find 
his legal theory persuasive does not mean that the court's judgment was in 
error. If error occurred in this case, it belonged to Coats, who did not 
obtain representation and chose not to file a responsive pleading.1 
Predictably unhappy with the court's unsurprising decision, Coats is now 
asking this Court to do what the trial court refused to: rescue him from his 
own dereliction by reversing the grant of summary judgment. However, 
because the legal theory advocated by Ward provides a sufficient basis for 
1
 Curiously, Coats makes no effort in his brief to explain why he failed to 
respond to the motion for summary judgment, instead, his brief is laced 
with a series of hypotheticais intended to posit how the outcome 
theoretically may have been different had Coats hired an attorney (i.e., 
what if Coats had filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against 
Ward). But Coats' speculative conjecture is irrelevant, since Utah law 
provides that parties that represent themselves will be held to the same 
standard of knowledge and practice as a qualified member of the bar. 
Hampton v. Professional Title Services, 2010 UT App. 294 % 3. 
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the trial court's decision, summary judgment in favor of Ward should be 
sustained. 
Because cotenancy creates a cooperative community of interest 
dependent upon good faith, Utah law imposes duties and obligations upon 
cotenants. Coats seeks refuge from iiability by claiming that the trial court 
predicated its grant of summary judgment on the narrow grounds that 
Coats was obligated to agree to escrow the proceeds of the sale. 
According to Coats' brief, his failure to agree to Graydon's conditions on 
the sale of the property was the only transgression alleged by Ward, and 
therefore must have been the basis for the court's decision. This is simply 
incorrect. Ward's iegal proposition, upon which the court granted summary 
judgment, isthe broader point that by virtue of their joint interests, cotenants 
stand in a unique relationship to one another, and that under the specific 
and unusual facts and circumstances of this case, Coats' refusal to 
cooperate in the sale of the property violated the reciprocal obligations 
inherent in the community of interest shared by Graydon, Coats, and Ward. 
Utah law recognizes that a special relationship of confidence and 
trust exists among cotenants. In Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.26 139 (Utah 
1983).Utah's Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of such a relationship 
and indicated that it necessarily included the imposition of obligations upon 
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cotenants. Without reaching the question of whether those obligations rose 
to the level of a fiduciary duty, the Jolley Court concluded that the 
relationship among cotenants precluded one from defaulting on an 
obligation and then attempting to extinguish the interest of the others by 
purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. While the Utah Supreme 
Court in Jolley opted not to decide whether a cotenant is under a fiduciary 
duty in every conceivable circumstance, the Court made two points clear: 
1) in at least some circumstances, cotenants have a fiduciary duty to one 
another; and 2) without using the label of "fiduciary," cotenants have 
obligations to one another, the violation of which warrants legal redress. 
Whatever we call these responsibilities, whether fiduciary duties, reciprocal 
obligations, or otherwise, is immaterial; regardless of the label, mutual 
duties are an innate part of membership in the community of interest 
among cotenants. At the very least, this duty includes an obligation to not 
obstruct or impede a cotenant's efforts to enjoy his interest in the property. 
In the present case, the actions of Coats and Graydon have jointly 
denied Ward the value of the property he owned as a cotenant. Unlike 
Coats' attenuated theory relating to a nonexistent duty to escrow the 
proceeds of the sale, Coats and Graydon engaged in a dangerous course 
of conduct that fundamentally deprived their cotenant, an innocent third 
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party, of his interest in the property. Coats' and Graydon's obstinate 
intransigence in the face of certain injury was more than a simple exercise 
of their right to be stubborn; it was a breach of their obligations to their 
cotenant. 
As a part of their divorce proceedings, and more than a year before 
the events giving rise to this action, Coats and Graydon had been ordered 
by the court to sell the property in dispute. Despite having had a year in 
which to sell the property, by January 2007 no purchaser had been found 
and the property was being foreclosed on. With a trustee's sale scheduled 
for 17 February 2007, Coats and Graydon knew that if they failed to sell the 
property prior to that date, it would be subject to a foreclosure sale at a 
substantially lower price than a private transaction would bring. None of 
the parties involved dispute that the value of the property was at least $5.2 
million, an amount well above the price it would sell for at a trustee's sale. 
In other words, Coats and Graydon absolutely knew that if the property did 
not sell before February 17. both of them, along with their cotenant Ward, 
would lose a significant amount of money. Yet even in the face of this 
certain loss, theyopted for a resolute and unyielding state of paralysis. 
Despite a binding agreement to sell the property to Hagen, Coats and 
Graydon allowed their tangential divorce to obstruct their clarity of thought. 
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and chose financial dissipation instead of cooperation and compromise. 
Coats seeks to justify his actions on the grounds that his refusal to 
agree to escrow the proceeds of the sale was reasonable and within his 
rights; it was neither. At the time Coats had two alternatives: agree to 
escrow the proceeds in order to complete the sale to Hagen; or refuse, let 
the agreement dissolve, and suffer a ioss in foreclosure. He had absolutely 
nothing to lose by agreeing to escrow, as under either alternative, Coats' 
proceeds from the sale would be subject to division in the pending divorce. 
Thus, his choice involved only the amount, not the outcome, of the 
proceeds of the sale. Had Coats agreed to escrow those proceeds, he 
stood to make more money. Instead, he refused, received a significantly 
diminished return, and had to pay Graydon the value of her resulting loss. 
In no way were his actions reasonable. And while Coats—and Graydon for 
that matter—may have the right to engage in the frivolous economic waste 
of their marital assets, those rights terminate when their actions impact the 
interests a third party. In light of the fact that he knew it would injure Ward, 
Coats' obdurate refusal to escrow the money was not within his rights. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Ward is similar to a minority 
shareholder in a closely held corporation. Holding less than 10% of the 
interest in the property, Ward was at the mercy of the majority owners, 
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Coats and Graydon. As a minority owner of a noniiquid asset with no 
market, Ward was left vulnerable with no ability to protect his interest. His 
only hope was that his cotenants would act fairly and in good faith. Their 
failure to do either warrants the imposition of liability for their breach of the 
obligations imposed by their duties as cotenants. As a result, the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment should be sustained. 
III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED BELOW 
Coats misses the mark with his arguments about evidence 
marshaling and his addendum attempting to demonstrate his efforts at 
same. Evidentiary arguments are inappropriate here. Evidence is offered 
for the purpose of establishing facts. The facts in this case became 
undisputed when Peter Coats failed to controvert them at the summary 
judgment stage.2 As such, whether it was proper for Michael Ward to 
receive judgment against Coats in the proceedings below was purely a 
question of law at both the summary judgment and Rule 59 stages. 
Sufficiency of evidence was a wholly inappropriate standard for Coats to 
rely upon at the Rule 59 stage. The portion of Rule 59(a)(6) dealing with 
sufficiency of evidence applies to situations where verdicts have been 
2
 Moreover, Coats acknowledges still that the facts in this case are 
undisputed. Brief of Peter Coats 10. 
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rendered after parties have presented evidence at trial—not to 
uncontroverted summary judgment motions, where facts were established 
by either agreement or failure to controvert the movant's version of them. If 
the court ignored Coats sufficiency-of-evidence claims at the Rule 59 
stage, it was because they were irrelevant. There were—and still are—no 
findings of fact in the case to challenge. Coats' entire addendum to his 
brief, along with the argument it contains, simply serves to confuse the 
issue. 
The only pertinent question during the Rule 59 stage was whether the 
judgment against Peter Coats was correct as a matter of law. By quoting 
language from Judge Lindberg's Minute Entry Order in his own brief, 
(reproduced in section I above) Coats has shown that the trial court 
engaged in a legal analysis on that question, and declined to reverse its 
earlier decision. 
Furthermore, Coats misapprehends the legal standard involved in a 
Rule 59 motion. For example, a court "has no discretion to grant a new trial 
absent a showing of one of the circumstances specified in Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(a)." Coats has failed to state in his brief in what manner he, or anyone 
else made a showing of any of those circumstances (other than the 
previously mentioned "sufficiency of evidence" argument), and thus has not 
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even demonstrated that the court below ever had the option o-' ranting a 
new trial. 
Coats seems to simply make the argument that the court's supposed 
abuse of discretion lay in its failure to reverse itself and find for Coats the 
second time around. Indeed, at another prominent point in the argument, 
Coats asserts that "Peter's action [in refusing the escrow arrangement] was 
not unlawful, in breach of contract, or in violation of any court order" Coats 
follows this conclusory language with yet another assertion that "the 
evidence is clearly insufficient that he did anything intentionally or 
wrongfully to prevent the sale of the property to Mr. Hagen." In fact, there 
is much about Coats' behavior that wrongfully prevented the sale. As a 
cotenant—and therefore a fiduciary—of Michael Ward, Coats was under an 
obligation not to diminish the value of the property. Coats was under an 
obligation to sell the property, both from an order of the divorce court, and 
from the impending trustee's sale attendant to Isabel Coats' foreclosure. 
He had a duty to ensure that the impending and inevitable sale net as 
much profit as possible. His intransigence in refusing to cooperate, along 
with that of Caroline Coats Graydon, ensured the demise of the Hagen 
deal, and thereby diminished the vaiue of Michael Ward's interest in the 
property. 
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Peter Coats has failed to make a coherent legal argument in support 
of his abuse of discretion claim. Furthermore, Coats has failed to allege 
any pertinent facts in support of that claim. Accordingly, that claim must 
fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Michael Ward 
respectfully asks this Court to uphold the trial court s award of summary 
judgment to Michael Ward against Peter Coats. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ day of November. 2010. 
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